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JPRS L/9407

21 November 1980

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 698



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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BENIN

COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC-POLITICAL-SOCIAL CONDITION ASSESSED HARSHLY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 pp 2480-2481

[Article: "After the Tours around the Country, the Political Commissioners Draw Up the Balance-Sheet of the Socioeconomic Situation"]

[Text] The six political commissioners have finished their contact and information tours in the country. They have made some "flabbergasting" observations, as one of them put it. Demobilization is total.

On the Economic Level

A general drop in production was noted, despite the production campaign, which has not had the hoped-for effects; there has been a sizable drop in food crops as well as industrial crops. Organization of productive forces has not been what the reports of the energy and policy officials anticipated and did not reflect the real physiognomy on the spot. Not all the difficulties, of course, are due to the people. Some come from the drought, and others from the unpreparedness of the authorities themselves, while still others are from the lack of awareness on the part of the organizing personnel.

Outside the agricultural domain, there are the unviable provincial companies, factories that have never come into existence, the breakdown of provincial finances. No objective assigned to these companies has been reached. It is true that from the time of their creation they had imperfections: the nonliquidation of the administrations from which they took over, with more liabilities than assets and sometimes even with all the liabilities and no assets.

Within the framework of the state plan, no provincial project has been carried out. Furthermore, the prefects at the time were more concerned with politician's politics than with concrete achievements for their provinces and districts.

The provincial public finances--based, as are the national finances, on taxes--have no solidity, the collection rate being practically nil. One political commissioner, drawing a clear lesson from these shortcomings, had to admit:

"On the whole, some serious problems are posed as regards the management of the finances of the local collectivities, and it must be noted that this situation has a negative influence on the functioning of the administrative organs and on the level of investment, which is practically nonexistent.

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"We must have the courage to tackle all these problems with the greatest probity and with determination to find correct and appropriate solutions for them which will give us means for solving the numerous problems that our popular masses face."

On the Political Level

On the whole, the political commissioners consider that the local bodies of the revolution are asleep, and that the People's Revolution Party of Benin has no hold on the population. Here too, the bitter balance-sheet should be drawn up with the political commissioner of Mono province, who gave a mordant description of the situation in the country: "At all levels, the slackening of revolutionary activity is obvious. Militant action has yielded to struggles of influence, to personal quarrels within the structures of mobilization, organization and guidance created for the purpose of carrying on methodically and scientifically the struggle for the establishment of the society of justice and social well-being to which our people aspire."

A generous idea meant to give a good conscience to certain leaders who are hardly concerned about the revolution; hold on the population. It is for this reason that the masses have not followed the watchwords. Thus, the advisers have made arbitrariness a law and corruption a rule of conduct. These officials terrorize those under their administration by their habits, which do not differ in the least from those of the feudal rulers whom it is their mission to combat.

Thus the deficiency of the economy, the failure of policy, have discouraged the country's productive forces, who prefer to expatriate themselves. The urban and rural exodus has drained the country's blood. The young people prefer to seek their fortune in neighboring countries, to seek training abroad.

On the Social and Cultural Level

The education problems which it was thought to solve by a vast campaign for the New School have engendered other, more important difficulties: the flight of the young, who no longer have confidence in the schooling dispensed at home. The drop in levels is widespread.

In the sector, a worthy effort is being made for health and literacy. Literacy could develop even more for advancement in the national languages.

The political commissioners should now be in the process of writing their reports. The cadres met with hope that they will not be complacent and that they will reflect accurately what they have seen on the spot, for as one Beninese civil servant said, the slogan "to take criticism and self-criticism as a rule of conduct" still does not have a hold on the party's people, who do not dare to tell themselves the truth.

These tours will prove to have been salutary, for they will make it possible to open the eyes of the Beninese authorities, who will certainly draw salutary lessons from them.

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BENIN

SWISS FIRM ACCUSED OF FRAUDULENT USE OF FUNDS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Oct 80 pp 2417-2418

[Article: "The Batima-Benin Affair: Two Frenchmen Still Held in Cotonou"]

[Text] Two Swiss nationals who had been held in Cotonou for more than a year, within the framework of the investigation into the Batima company, arrived in Lagos, Nigeria, on 23 September, after being authorized to leave Beninese territory.

Messrs Knenbhuler, 44, and Wehrli, 32--respectively, construction manager and site superintendent for the Swiss company--had been constrained to remain in Cotonou by the Beninese government, which accuses the subsidiary of Batima, a Geneva holding company, of misappropriation of funds.

Furthermore, two French nationals who work for the same firm are still held in Benin. They are Messrs H. Estran and H. Brochard--respectively, company manager and accountant. They were summoned at the beginning of September, for the first time, by the Beninese examining magistrate, who informed them of the items for which they were indicted. Mr Estran, questioned by telephone, has declared that the charges lodged against him--falsification of balance-sheet, forgery and use of forgery, swindling and breach of trust--are previous to his arrival in Benin and are attributable "solely to the company's managers, who are in Switzerland."

The two Frenchmen--who are managerial staff for a company responsible for building a 250-room international hotel with a value of 4 billion CFA francs, financed entirely by Benin--arrived in Cotonou after the work had begun. The financial situation of the Beninese subsidiary of the Swiss group was already very poor.

Before effectively taking up his duties, Mr Estran had found a "hole" in the company's management and had advised the Beninese authorities of it. According to different estimates, these embezzlements fall between 800 million and more than 1.5 billion CFA francs. Estran was arrested immediately after his revelations, and Brochard a month later. They were kept under close observation for 7 months without being accused. Since then, with authorization from the Beninese authorities, they have lived in the French embassy in Cotonou, but they are not authorized to leave Benin.

The evolution of the situation of the four men--notably the freeing of the two Swiss--could be due, according to unconfirmed rumors, to the Swiss government's decision to take on the liabilities of the Beninese subsidiary of the Batima company.

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BURUNDI

PARIS MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS BURUNDI PRESIDENT

LD291547 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Oct 80 pp 11-14

[Interview with Burundi President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza by JEUNE AFRIQUE: "First Milestones in Rebuilding Process"--date and place of interview not given]

[Text] JEUNE AFRIQUE: If you don't mind, we will break with tradition and start not with domestic questions but with the problems which are dividing Africa. We will start with the West Sahara affair. Burundi was one of the first states to recognize the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR]. According to some people it did so under pressure from Arab friends. How and why was this recognition given?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: We were not in charge of Burundi's national responsibilities at the time. Consequently it is not necessary to say how that recognition was given. However we will continue to recognize the SDAR. For us it is a question of principles and interests. First principles: We must apply the recognized principle of self-determination to all peoples, including the Saharan people. The Africans have always been divided and colonized at the will of invaders and colonialists. That is no more acceptable when it is done by other Africans.

Second, interests: Being a small country Burundi could be swallowed up without the chance of determining the future. Like West Sahara.

Difficult to Classify

JEUNE AFRIQUE: In general, how would you define your country's diplomacy? Close to the progressives or the moderates?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: We have always thought that these definitions of "progressives" or "moderates" cannot be applied to everybody, in any case not to Burundi. We are guided by a few great principles, such as positive nonalignment and support for national liberation movements and for oppressed peoples. You can classify us according to the particular stances we take on specific issues. Aside from that it is up to the journalists to answer your question.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: How do you classify the Unity and National Progressive Party [UPRONA] of which you are president? What is its ideology and its doctrine?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Its ideology and doctrine with regard to what? UPRONA has developed a great deal since it was formed in 1959. At first it was nationalist

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and anticolonialist. It has changed a great deal since the December 1977 congress. Our ideology is based on the principles of social justice. We want a better distribution of national resources and not control by a few people over this wealth and over the work of others. We have laid the foundations for democracy and show solidarity with oppressed peoples.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: In its charter UPRONA declares war on social injustice and man's exploitation of man without ever using the word "socialism." Why is that? Is it to avoid leftwing terminology? Or could it be that you are socialists without saying so?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: This is leftwing terminology in that we are struggling against man's exploitation of man. However, we accept private property, and cooperation with all countries in the world on the basis of mutual interests. If necessary we will examine our relations with the multinationals within the context of our investment code.

The Middle Way

JEUNE AFRIQUE: While wishing to attack social injustice you are giving a big place to national and foreign private initiative. Is that not inconsistent?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: It may seem to be but it is not. Here property is private but not exploitative. In any case that is what we are trying to achieve. Small businesses are private but big business is gradually coming under state control. In principle we should have control of Burundi's wealth but we also conclude service contracts which are advantageous for foreigners who wish to invest in our country. The young people in our country criticize us for these "inconsistencies." For us it is complementary.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Your country is situated between two of the region's big countries: Tanzania and Zaire. What is the state of your relations with each of them? To which side does Burundi lean?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: We have very good relations with both. We even belong to two economic units to which our two neighbors belong respectively. We belong to the economic community of great lakes countries with Zaire and Rwanda and to the Akagera Basin Commission with Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. Furthermore we have had Dar es-Salaam and Kinshasha as capitals since we were for 30 years part of the German empire before becoming part of the Belgian empire for 46 years. Today our transport system is directed toward the East (Tanzania) while most of our trade is carried on with our western neighbor (Zaire). The three countries complement each other and Burundi takes the middle course. It must avoid leaning to either side.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: The UPRONA Party claims to be a mass party. How do you manage to combine peasants, businessmen and intellectuals?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: It is very difficult; there are problems in persuading them to join forces. The peasant is not very demanding, unlike the middle classes who demand living conditions in keeping with their citizen's status.

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Our policy is aimed at preventing the emergence of great disproportion between the party's various components. How? We must try to ensure that the country undergoes balanced development: Between the various social classes, the regions, between the cities and the rural districts for which we must quickly create acceptable living conditions by building schools, pharmacies and so forth. Have we the means of achieving that? It will take time and a great deal of money.

LD291549 JEUNE AFRIQUE: Will the UPRONA Party continue to be the only party for long?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: That is its vocation. It withstood all the ups and downs experienced by Burundi until its great victory in September 1961 when all the other Burundi political forces merged in it to form a mass party representing all political factions.

The thing to be feared today is internal divisions which have nothing to do with politics and which could bring about the formation of "minorities." However the dangers are really minimal.

USSR Absent

JEUNE AFRIQUE: The ethnic obsession seems to have subsided somewhat. To what do you attribute this success?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: The UPRONA Party has kept united all the social or ethnic classifications which could be made in this country. That is the main explanation. The ethnic question was an anti-Burundi weapon used by the colonialists. There are no ethnic groups in Burundi. There are not even any villages. There is one tribe; the Burundis.

There is a special patrilineal system. Lines of descent do exist. Colonialism found a united country in which it was impossible to distinguish tribes. It was only on the eve of independence that people began to discover tribes. The virus which was spread in that way has been and still is exploited. However the great mass of the Burundi people are resisting. They know that the essential point is to be found elsewhere. This does not mean that we could not experience events comparable to those which took place in 1972. However now that the danger has been averted, it is up to the government to eliminate the causes. We have the means to do so; mass effort.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What is the state of Burundi's economy? What stage has agricultural diversification reached?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: The situation is both good and bad. It is bad because of the world economic situation. Everything costs more; transport, fuel, equipment and so forth. Our inflation is essentially imported.

The situation is good because Burundi has no balance of payments problem, or food problems, since our harvests are good.

Diversification, however, is still in its early stages. It is principally being applied to export crops: Tea and cotton, which have now been added to coffee.

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We are also planning to export vegetables to Europe. However the market is too expensive and is already occupied. Burundi cannot do a great deal in the export sphere since raw material prices are gradually slumping. Concerted action is necessary at regional, African and world levels in the framework of north-south dialogue. We are trying to increase trade in our subregion within the economic community of great lakes countries and among the Akagera basin countries.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Several industrialized countries are taking part in development projects in Burundi. However the USSR is absent. Why?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Yes, that is true. The USSR is completely absent. We have made and are continuing to make approaches to the USSR. However it is difficult to obtain a reply. Moreover the USSR is totally absent from development projects throughout the region. We do not know the reasons for its "indifferences."

Neutrality

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What about your relations with the United States?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: They are neutral. In general the United States follows a policy of concentration; in other words it concentrates its efforts on big countries. The impression we have is that it has already made its choice: Zaire, Nigeria, Kenya and so forth. It is not very interested in small countries like Burundi. This is consistent with their imperial policy.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What about China?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Our cooperation is well underway. Provided China does not change its policy, and that is possible, and even already perceptible. We have the impression that China's pro-third policy, which was once dynamic, is waning. Until then we had no complaint about Chinese cooperation.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What do you think of the French presence?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: We have excellent cooperation with France, which is involved in all spheres: Education, the army, industrialization, communications and the training of technicians.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: You are said to have sympathies with the North Koreans and Cubans.

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Korea plays no part in our development projects or in training our cadres. It merely helped us to organize the UPRONA Party. As for the Cuban presence, I can state that it is limited to around 10 doctors and nurses. Some people felt the need to say that Cuba is training army pilots. The truth is that we do not even have the embryo of an air force. We only have three helicopters.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is the absence of the two superpowers an advantage or a handicap?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: For us it is certainly an advantage until proved otherwise.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: And yet, in view of your strategic position they should be flinging themselves at Burundi.

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Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Burundi is a small country without any importance. It has neither the destiny nor the ambition to lead Africa, a subregion, still less the world. We want to stay in our place and play a modest role in the world, making our voice and our principles heard. Strategic position? From the military viewpoint we could be crushed easily since we are land-locked. Nobody could sail their nuclear submarines here....

Vigilance

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Do you not feel that your diplomacy, which aspires to be militant, is winning you enemies?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: As soon as you want to be independent you make enemies among those who want to align you. That explains some of the gratuitous attacks we have suffered from some western newspapers. They are trying to arouse suspicion through denigration. We have more and better things to do within our borders: Overcoming underdevelopment.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

NEW FRENCH AID PLANNED FOR COUNTRY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Oct 80 p 2428

[Article: "New French Aid"]

[Text] An official communique, published 26 September in Bangui after a private visit to Paris by President Dacko, states that a credit of 700 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs, in addition to a budgetary aid, was put at the disposal of the Central African Government by France, with a view to reequip prefectural and subprefectural administrations "doomed to neglect for very many years by the imperial regime." Moreover, "the release (in October) of 2 billion CFA francs earmarked for the payment of debts by the state to the private sector and for damages to be paid to the victims of the 21 September 1979 looting, was obtained."

Taking a loan from the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation was also considered, with the idea of financing a study of a plan for a sugar refinery, and the issue of renovating the Bangui telephone network and installing a land communications station was also discussed.

The communique adds that certain big projects, which had been shelved, were mentioned, in this instance the "cotton" project which will have to be reactivated in the near future, thanks to the efforts of the technical mission set up by the French Cooperation; and it states that there was also the matter of the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) assuming responsibility for the Central African students residing in France.

Finally, the communique deplores the "vast denigratory campaign, run by the French press during the presidential campaigns, and whose fallout, unfortunately, tarnishes the image of Central African brands."

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COMORO ISLANDS

POSSIBLE REINTEGRATION OF MAYOTTE REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Oct 80 pp 46-47

[Article by Antonia Blis and Special Correspondent Dorothee Durban: "Alternative Plans in Paris"]

[Text] The reintegration of Mayotte into the Comorian entity might well come about through a "redevelopment" of the Comorian regime.

The recent visit of Paul Dijoud, the French secretary of state for the Interior Ministry (overseas departments and territories), to Mayotte last September, makes it possible to take stock of the archipelago's development since it became, in 1975, a "territorial body of the French Republic." Despite 110,000,000 in investments in four years the situation remains problematical in all areas.

In agriculture, the objective of self-sufficiency is far from being attained. Importation of rice, the essential basis of the diet, is still significant, since it has reached 4,406 tons per year, or half of the consumption. This despite a local production three times what it was. Production of crops for export, which would make it possible to equilibrate a trade balance in which there is a considerable deficit, is stagnating (like the vanilla and copra crops) or is lower, such as ylang-ylang (23 tons in 1979). Coffee production alone has increased slightly.

The situation could be improved with the use of better implements, different methods of cultivation, development of new land and, in particular, reforming the ownership of property. But although the principle of forming cooperatives--to which the government has promised to give modern means--has been achieved, changing the real property system, which is heavily subject to the customary rules, is far from being achieved.

Fishing, which could be a good asset to the Mahorese economy, is under-developed. The number of motorized boats has certainly increased considerably (150 at present), but their range is too short to exploit--with security--the farthest perimeters of the coral reef, the Glorious and the Geyser Banks. Moreover, the few units undertaking the voyage do not at present have the capability of processing the catch. The production, therefore, is only for local consumption, which mortgages any possibility of exporting, for example, to Reunion, which is a large importer.

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After fishing, it is in the area of education and health that there are significant delays. The lack of teachers is glaring; as for their training, it leaves much to be desired, since the teachers are recruited toward the end of the third, or the fourth, or even the fifth class! Under these conditions, only 35 percent of the children of school age go to school. The island has only one college; those who are able to pursue their studies must go to Moroni (Comores) or Reunion. The linguistic problem would still have to be taken into account, the majority of the population, of course, not speaking French. It is in professional training that progress has been most noticeable up to now, with the aid of the Haut-Rhin regional council, which took care of bringing in several teachers.

In the health area, the island's first surgical group is going to be installed in the Kaoueni Hospital. And a huge campaign to eradicate malaria is to be undertaken. But to be effective these measures should be accompanied by an acceleration of the program to bring in a water supply and a complete rehabilitation; collection of household waste, for example, is nonexistent at present. Tuberculosis and leprosy, which still afflict 500 persons, are also still to be totally conquered.

Finally, while opening up the villages of the archipelago is almost totally completed, the air connections and telephone communications with the outside are to be improved.

But if the situation is far from bright in the social and economic areas, it is especially complicated in the political area. As he did in November 1979, Paul Dijoud has just reaffirmed that Mayotte will not be a "French department," because this is not in "France's interest." Mayotte's future, the representative from Paris added, will be whatever the Mahorese want it to be and the regional council, which is "praiseworthy and responsible," will have a major role to play, deciding how Mahorese men and women are to live. These words, one suspects, were scarcely appreciated by the leaders of the Mahorese Popular Movement and the Mahorese Rally for the Republic, who are militating in favor of a "full, complete and irreversible" departmentalization.

Thus, paradoxically, Paul Dijoud's 2-day visit to Mayotte will have left a profound bitter taste in the mouths of the holders of power who in the end "represent" France in the archipelago. All the more so because the secretary of State has stressed the need for "democracy," which could be interpreted as an implicit criticism addressed to the "gang of four," which consists of Senator Marcel Henry, Adrien Giraud, Jean-Francois Hory and Deputy Younoussa Bamana, the president of the regional council, who are monopolizing the floor.

"All political parties are free to express themselves wherever and whenever they want to," Paul Dijoud asserted. "Those who want to leave France must be able to express themselves. Freedom of expression must be favored in Mayotte. All political parties must be able to express themselves on the radio; public debates over the radio must be organized with all the representatives of political life. The Mahorese must not be afraid to talk about their future among themselves."

Normally, after that speech, one would then hear over the airwaves of FR 3-Mayotte from other movements, such as the Party for the Democratic Rally of the Mahorese (PRDM) of Ali Said, who favors reintegration of Mayotte into a Comorian entity that would, however, remain under the protection of France; or the Association of Comoro Trainees and Students (ASEC), which is represented in both territories. But it is

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too soon to prejudge the result, and some believe that in the end this exhortation is addressed to the Reunionese rather than the Comorians, the FR 3 broadcasts being in fact increasingly criticized in Reunion.

In the course of his trip Paul Dijoud also let it be known that France intended to favor normalization of relations between Mayotte and Moroni, "to prepare the Mahorese for a closer cohabitation with their Comorian neighbors." There is nothing surprising about that, since the overthrow by Bob Denard and his mercenaries in May 1978 of the progressive regime of President Ali Soilih, and the return to the saddle by Ahmed Abdallah, a person who is totally pledged to France. Moreover, it is well known that since then everything has been done to prevent the United Nations and the OAU from continuing to be concerned about the problem of Mayotte, an infectious thorn planted in the continent's flank. Again last 2 May the "Islamic Republic of the Comores" sent the secretary general of the United Nations a reassuring message affirming that "positive elements had occurred since December 1979 in the dialog between the Comores and France, in order to seek a solution to the problem of the Comorian island of Mayotte" and that "concrete measures really capable of leading to gradual integration of Mayotte into the Comorian body had been taken." It must be said that all these attempts at "dedramatization," on the part of a state directed and infiltrated by mercenaries and a disgrace to Africa, scarcely attained their goal. Despite the opposition of France, which emphasized that "The Island of Mayotte was French by virtue of the principle of self-determination and that the United Nations did not have to intervene in the internal affairs of this territory," the bureau of the General Assembly of the international organization decided, by 18 votes and 7 abstentions, to put the question of "the Comorian island of Mayotte" on its agenda again.

An Advanced Base

For the time being it seems that nothing can develop without France's agreement. For Mayotte, let us not forget, is still the advanced base for the French navy on the route of the giant oil tankers. The Mayotte lagoon, in fact, is one of the largest in the world, and almost the entire French navy could find refuge there. On the occasion of Paul Dijoud's visit a concentration of vessels had been arranged, with most of the French Indian Ocean fleet.

According to the lieutenant on the ship, "Pansart," all of these vessels are assuring the defense of Mayotte and of one of the hot spots of the globe, the oil railway that follows the Mozambique Canal.

However, the words of Paul Dijoud, whether they concern the need to "democratize" political life in Mayotte or to prepare for "closer cohabitation of the Mahorese with the Comorians," acquire their full meaning when one is aware that the government in Paris--or at the very least certain French circles--are seeking a less overtly colonial and mercenary in both cases. It is known, in fact, that where the Mayotte problem is concerned France is almost totally isolated in Africa, where no one has acknowledged the influence of the referendums and self-determination as being in favor of maintaining the colonial protectorate. On the other hand it is known that the regime of "President" Ahmed Abdallah is being more and more openly questioned by a population that does not want to hear mercenaries mentioned. The incidents last August that pitted the "president's" son against the rebelling population and the elected representatives of the island of Anjouan showed that every day the situation is becoming increasingly explosive in the Comoros, where about 100 arrests have been made in recent weeks.

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Neither Yes nor No

In those circumstances, France is credited with the plan for repeating in Moroni a palace coup similar to "Operation Barracuda" in Bangui, which relieved it of an Ahmed Abdallah who was not very representative, nor was he credible. Here and now, several possible alternative names are being suggested, including that of Said Ali Kemal, who last July resigned his post as ambassador to Paris from the Comores, at the time of the slight ministerial reshuffling in Moroni. The name, too, of President Ali Soilih's former Foreign Affairs Minister, Mouzaour Abdallah, who, it will be remembered, said neither yes nor no to the mercenary coup d'etat of May 1978. It was in that perspective, moreover, that Paris was seeking to manipulate certain opposition groups.

Today, therefore, all suppositions are possible. And the reintegration of Mayotte into the Comorian whole could well come about, at least in the minds of France and its lackeys, through a "redevelopment" of the Comorian regime. It remains to be seen if the populations concerned will let themselves be speeded up and accept the solutions imposed on them from on high--solutions which would only serve to perpetuate, in a more camouflaged form, the colonial and feudal oppression.

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CONGO

EDF AID FOR FINANCING OF NATIONAL PROJECT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Oct 80 p 2428

[Article: "9.4 Billion CFA [African Financial Community] Francs For the Congo, Authorized By the Fifth EDF [European Development Fund]]

[Text] The final communique published at the end of negotiations recently conducted between the Congo and the CEE in Brazzaville, pointed out that the Congolese Government was informed by a delegation from the Commission of European Communities that a maximum of about 9.4 billion CFA francs will be given to the Congo in the form of a subsidy authorized by the fifth EDF.

The communique adds that 6.1 billion CFA francs in loans, under special conditions, and about 2.7 billion CFA francs for financing national projects would also be given to the Congo.

The two delegations also exchanged views on regional cooperation for which will be reserved between 14,600 million and 17,500 CFA francs to finance regional projects in Central Africa.

The communique adds that the delegation from the Commission of the European Communities indicated that the new ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries]-CEE Accord presented other prospects for future intervention that would be beneficial to the Congolese economy, in particular in the area of energy and mining, and would bring action for commercial advancement and microproduction.

At the end of the negotiations, a program indicative of Community aid was signed by the two delegations.

The communique essentially stated that during the meetings the Congolese delegation made known the main objectives of its development fund as well as its economic and financial position.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM PRODUCTION TO TRIPLE--Congolese petroleum production is expected to triple with the opening, in 1981, of four wells off Pointe-Noire. The Congo could then join the ranks of OPEC, which already has two small producers-exporters of oil: Ecuador and Gabon. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Oct 80 p 31]

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GHANA

BRIEFS

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES--According to the Bank of Ghana official economic report, published in September, the country's foreign exchange reserve rose this year at the end of May to 299.6 million cedis as compared with 247.3 million at the end of April and 260.2 million at the end of May last year. Still according to the same report, outstanding foreign payments at the end of May rose to 994.8 million cedis which was a decrease of 57.6 million cedis as compared with the end of April. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS In French 10 Oct 80 p 2484] 8870

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GUINEA

DETAILS GIVEN OF FOURTH DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2477

[Text] President Sekou Toure informed the Council of Guinean ministers that the total fourth plan financial allotment for Guinea's economic and social development (1981-1985) will be 38 billion syllis (a syl is worth 11 FCEA [African Financial Community Franc]). The head of the Guinean state pointed out that 32 billion will be devoted to investments (84 percent), and 6 percent to the liquidation of the public debt in order to attain an annual 5 percent increment in ready cash from domestic raw output during the 1981-85 period.

That implies, Mr Sekou Toure said, that the rural and industrial sectors have received a powerful stimulus which was to result in their experiencing an average annual 3 to 8 percent rate of growth.

In the future plan, the Guinean president went on to say, they intend to grant significant importance to the productive sectors which make a 59 percent profit on the total financial allocation: agriculture, waters and forests (22 percent), industry (10 percent), mines and geology (8 percent), public works (7 percent). The sectors share among them the remainder of the financial allocation: town planning (4 percent), banks, trade and insurance (3 percent) education, culture and information (6 percent), and administrative substructure (5 percent).

Mr Sekou Toure also stated that agriculture will continue to have priority in the program. Its development will be based on farming output (agro-pastoral farms and cooperatives) and on the construction of hydro-agricultural microdams and the installation of small reservoirs for irrigated farming. A suitable place will be set aside for cereal production with an eye to its becoming a self-sufficient food product.

In the mining industry, the head of state continued, we shall seek ways and means to increase the output of existing mines, their diversification and preparation for the processing industry.

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

PLO REPRESENTATION'S AMBASSADORIAL STATUS--Guinea has raised PLO diplomatic representation to ambassadorial status. This decision was conveyed to the PLO representative in this country when he presented his credentials to President Sekou Toure. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2477] 8870

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IVORY COAST

BOKASSA: SOURCE OF GISCARD-HOUPHOUET SPLIT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Oct 80 pp 22-25

[Article by Sennen Andriemiredo: "Bokassa Between Giscard and Houphouet"]

[Text] One year after losing his throne, forgotten in the Ivory Coast where he lives in a gilded exile which he owes to Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Jean-Bedel Bokassa is not politically dead, in France. All he has to do is make waves in Abidjan, and his imprecations and calls for revenge are heard in the wings and recesses of French politics during this pre-election period. On 9 September, during a fifty-eight minute telephone call to the Paris editorial staff of the CANARD ENCHAINE, he stirred up the murky depths of an electoral campaign in which it seems that the presidential candidates and particularly the out-going president will be spared nothing. During this telephone conversation, the former emperor of Central Africa discussed nothing but his personal involvements with his former "dear relation."

Nothing was said about the political reasons for his ouster. At most he claimed that the number of students massacred at Bangui in January and May of 1979 was exaggerated. At most he asked for the creation of an international commission of inquiry to give him a hearing. By contrast, he was particularly talkative about his peculiar relations with Giscard d'Estaing's family. "Yes, [I gave] three times [diamonds] to Giscard and once to his wife. That makes four times... And to his cousins as well. You cannot imagine what I handed over to that family." His thinking clouded by his diamonds, aware that after his ouster in the night of 20 to 21 September, the French family "moved out" everything there was in his Berengo palace, he exclaimed: "They took from me in a pot, a big pot. Well, there were 14,000 diamonds in this pot. In the diplomatic pouch with the combination lock, there have been 2,700 cut diamonds." (NDLR)*

*(Editor's note) We have reproduced Bokassa's statements exactly as he made them.

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Bokassa wants two things: to return to his country (on his throne, very likely), but also to tell his story, in order to denounce the betrayal of France in general and Giscard in particular. He said that "Delpey must be allowed to speak. He knows everything from A to Z." But Roger Delpey, a Colonial Army veteran whom he met in Indochina and wanted to turn into his right-hand man and the universal messenger of his revenge, cannot speak.

Arrested on 10 May 1980 as he left the Libyan Embassy in Paris, Delpey is at the Sante Prison, charged with "complicity with agents of a foreign power, of such a nature as to be harmful to France's diplomatic situation." He allegedly made contact with Libya to finance Bokassa's revenge campaign against France: publication of a white paper and distribution of secret documents turned over to him by the deposed emperor.

According to his attorneys however, nothing in the pretrial files supports the allegation that Delpey had any "complicity" with "a foreign power", a motive which would bring his case under the jurisdiction of the State Security Court. After his arrest, Delpey was questioned three times: on 10, 14, and 26 June. Nothing since. Procedure is at a standstill. All it took was Bokassa's reawakening, for the French press to remember Roger Delpey, who has been reduced to silence as in "the good old Bastille days" according to some commentators.

Compromising

But what knowledge can Delpey have which would account for such silence? The famous confidences of Bokassa. In May 1979, he offered his services to "His Majesty" who at the time was abandoned by his former friends for not having known how to kill moderately and discreetly. On 16 August, the report of the "investigation committee" of African jurists was published. The monarch knew he was "finished." Between 20 and 31 August, he summoned Delpey who came to Bangui and is believed to have secured 187 documents which were compromising for the French presidential family. Bokassa had understood that France had decided to overturn him. One month later, it was done.

Flouted Husband

When he learned of this on 21 September during a stopover in Libya -- he asserted to some Libyans that he was leaving for an official visit to France! -- he deposited a large amount of money in a Tripoli bank. Delpey later maintained that he made contact with the Libyans on instructions from Bokassa and for the sole purpose of unfreezing this money. He did have three meetings with the former monarch in his Abidjan exile: in October and December 1979, then in February 1980. He was even supposed to meet a mysterious Zairian businessman settled in Libya who would have been able to release Bokassa's account. But the meeting never took place.

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So on 17 April and 3 May 1980, Delpey went to the Libyan Embassy in Paris to effect negotiations himself. On 10 May he went back. As he left, he was arrested by the DST (Directorate of Territorial Security). This was because in the meantime, the French presidency had learned the nature of a message which Delpey was beginning to distribute, and had decided to put a stop to it. At a meeting in Nice of the Seventh French-African Summit (8-10 May 1980), Giscard personally learned from his peers that Delpey was supposed to have transmitted a letter from Bokassa to several African heads of state. What did this letter say? Nothing extraordinary really, about French-African relations, let alone high-level policy in France. Giscard d'Estaing did not sufficiently esteem his former "relation" to entrust him with state secrets. Bokassa's letter is in his own image. It is whining, vindictive, vengeful, sordid: a violent indictment against Giscard's France. For that matter the former tyrant here claims that he was already supposed to be deposed in May 1979, and that his prime minister, Henri Maldou, and his vice-prime minister, Alphonse Koyamba, were giving in to French pressure when they hastily signed his deposition. He expresses indignation that, contrary to promises made to him by Rene Journiac (who was then government advisor on African affairs and had vainly asked him to abdicate), he was turned away from France where he sought refuge "as a Frenchman" -- in reality the promise had become irrelevant since its condition was abdication and not ouster. Nevertheless Bokassa considers himself the victim not only of a betrayal but of ingratitude as well.

In his letter, he even stresses this ingratitude more than the betrayal, by making scurrilous revelations about Giscard d'Estaing, going as far as to assert that relations between the French president and the Central African empress were more than friendly. Considering himself betrayed as an emperor and flouted as a spouse, Bokassa demands a confrontation with Giscard, no more and no less.

Explosive Manuscript

The letter was no longer distributed after Delpey's arrest on 10 May. Nevertheless Giscard was not out of trouble: the 187 documents supposedly held by Delpey could not be found. On 26 June, the accused told investigators that they never existed. Another problem was to get hold of an even more explosive document: Bokassa's memoirs, the manuscript of which was said to have left Abidjan without reaching France. It had to be looked for, this time abroad.

The SDECE (Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service), specialized in investigations abroad, took over from the DST. Its search led it first to Belgium and Switzerland, two French-speaking countries whose liberalism often makes it possible to publish works whose distribution is forbidden in France. But no Belgian or Swiss publisher had received Bokassa's manuscript. It was only in August 1980 that "a serious lead" brought SDECE sleuths to Spain. This time, recovery of the document

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was a sure thing. But nobody knew if this was the only copy -- whose destruction would silence Bokassa -- or if it one of several. French agencies were therefore more on the alert than ever. This was the moment chosen (?) by Bokassa to emerge from his mud and splatter Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Daddy Bok can really hold a grudge. And, as he says: "When I talk, I talk!"

How was he able to telephone the CANARD ENCHAINE in Paris, from his Abidjan retreat, for fifty-eight minutes (sixty-four, according to Abidjan sources), when it is no secret that an international connection can always be tapped, heard, and therefore interrupted? In asking this question, some French newspapers have cast doubt on the efficiency of the surveillance around the former despot. In his residence half-way up Cocody Hill in Abidjan, Bokassa is in reality well guarded by Ivorian police. Visitors are screened, but he receives people who are close to him (his family, and three remaining followers), as well as a few Ivorians who surreptitiously supply him with whiskey: "Pop is against it", he says. Pop is Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the Ivorian president who has taken him under his untouchable and unflappable patriarchal wing. But if Pop doesn't want him to get drunk on whiskey, he doesn't want him to get himself talked about, either. Thus the question is, how was Bokassa able to talk?

In France, speculation is rife. In certain political circles, it is even claimed that Houphouet let things happen because he feels resentment against Giscard, and there are suggestions that French-Ivorian relations are deteriorating. For example, because of the cocoa affair (the Ivory Coast is the world's leading producer with 320,000 tons this year.)

This affair goes back to December 1979. At the time, Houphouet wrote to Giscard, asking him to use his influence to save cocoa prices which the consumer countries -- European and American -- were not displeased to see falling. The French president promised to do all he could. This was not much. On 30 March, British and West German intransigence defeated negotiations in London for a new international cocoa agreement (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1013): the base price demanded by the producing countries (120 cents per pound, or about 220 CFA francs at the time) was rejected, while consumers held out for a figure of only 110 cents. Abidjan businessmen affirm that Ivorian authorities were vexed by this failure on Giscard's part.

Anger of the Old Man?

Yet the French president did not give up. At the Nice French-African Summit in May, he promised his peers to redouble pressure on West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He also mentioned a project for an international equalization fund, designed to stabilize tropical product prices. This was a new setback: cocoa prices continued to drop and in July 1980 (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1028) they reached their lowest level since June 1976.

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The Ivory Coast did withdraw its production from the international market in order to make prices rise. President Houphouet asked his African peers to do the same, and even proposed subsidies to finance stockpiles. But the Ivory Coast can hold out in ways that Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Togo cannot. These countries decided to sell their supply, at the market price, which was insignificant. Gossip then spread in Abidjan that French pressure had something to do with it. And it was theorized once again that Houphouet is set against Giscard.

Giscard the Newcomer

There was really no truth in it. Suspicions did arise, but were dissipated right after the French-African Summit in Nice. At France's request, the Gabonese minister of foreign affairs, Martin Bongo, served as the go-between. During the second half of May, he shuttled between Paris and Abidjan, to assure Houphouet of Giscard's good faith and to reassure the latter about the former's understanding and trust. Since then France has shown constant initiative. In mid-September, Giscard d'Estaing sent Robert Galley, his minister for cooperation, to London and Bonn to make the British and Germans more amenable. This was rather perfidiously commented upon by some French political circles: "This negotiation is taking place right after Bokassa's latest trick. It is meant to please Houphouet and convince him to muzzle his protege more efficiently." As proof, it was said that Giscard's UDF (French Democratic Union) was not invited to the Ivorian party congress of 29 September. In fact it had been, but did not send delegates. As for the orthodox gaullists of Jacques Chirac (RPR: Rally for the Republic), they sent Mr Kosciusko-Morizet, who thus found himself the sole representative of the French political sector.

In fact, if a few clouds darken French-Ivorian relations, the reason is not cocoa. Nor is it some attempt on the part of Giscard to meddle in Ivorian affairs: it has been said in print, in Paris, that Giscard supposedly made a discreet suggestion to Houphouet to retain Philippe Yace as successor-designate, and that this negotiation cost Yace the succession. To put forth such a hypothesis is inaccurate and shows a lack of understanding of Ivorian politics. Philippe Yace is going because Houphouet has had enough of him (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1028).

If Houphouet does feel reticent about Giscard, the reason is neither economic (cocoa) nor political (succession). It is emotional, irrational, and therefore deep-rooted. It nearly surfaced in connection with the French-American Summit in Nice. The Ivorian president wanted to participate but could not because he was receiving Pope John Paul II in Abidjan. He asked his French counterpart, who was hosting the meeting, to postpone the date. Giscard did not resolve to do so, and used the somewhat justified excuse that other chiefs of state were already invited. In Houphouet's eyes, someone like Charles de Gaulle, who understood Africa better, would have agreed. But Giscard is not de Gaulle. And this may be the real ailment afflicting French-Ivorian if not French-African relations today.

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Safaris or Pilgrimage

A member of the new generation, the present French chief of state "was only secretary of state" when the likes of Houphouet-Boigny, Senghor, or Ahidjo dealt with de Gaulle, if not on an equal footing, at least an equal respect on all parts for the age and "wisdom" of each. Giscard d'Estaing belongs to another kind of statesmen. He is "young" in politics and a newcomer in Africa.

Africa's "Elders", that is, its wise men, have never looked favorably upon Giscard's safaris in Gabon or Central Africa, when he should more frequently have made wise pilgrimages to Yamoussoukro, Houphouet's native village. Worse, because of his nature, because of the seniority of his relations with France, Houphouet-Boigny does not understand, does not accept the fact that Giscard d'Estaing does not think more often about consulting him, about asking his advice on every French-African topic. And he is saddened that the French chief of state behaves as if he, Houphouet-Boigny, was only another African president like all the others, whereas he is "The Elder" for everyone, including his peers. This is a conviction which brooks no discussion in his view.

Houphouet's Proteges

Would this generation gap cause Houphouet to let Bokassa bark at Giscard from time to time? Surely not. A patriarch such as he considers himself to be would not use such methods. But it is not impossible that French technicians or advisors allowed Bokassa to speak without warning him. Giscard's republic has not managed to take hold in the Ivory Coast and that is precisely why the republic of de Gaulle and Pompidou is still there, together with the nostalgic holdovers of Imperial France, the lost soldiers of the Foccart networks -- named after Jacques Foccart who was de Gaulle's principal link with Africa.

Houphouet, on the contrary, ordered that Bokassa be forbidden to speak. To protect Giscard, in mid-September, he also refused the request of David Dacko, president of Central Africa, for extradition of the former emperor who, if passed in judgement, would have been capable of turning his trial into that of his relations with France. For the same reason Houphouet forbade Bokassa to receive the press before April 1981, date of presidential elections in France. Thus he is watching over Giscard's immediate future. And thus he appears somewhat like his protector, just as he is already the protector of Bokassa.

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KENYA

BRIEFS

EAPL DEFICIT--During the first 6 months of 1979, the /East African Power and Lighting Company (EAP&L)/ [published in italics] showed a loss of 20 million shillings in its sales figures compared to 80 million shillings profit it had shown during the same 6 months of the preceding year. This loss was due to damages that occurred at the hydroelectric complex of the company and at another one of its installations, as well as to the need to use diesel generators which use oil. The increase in the sales price of electricity could not compensate for this loss. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Oct 80 p 2430] 9465

EDF-FINANCED IRRIGATION PROJECT--On the cover of this issue, we are publishing a view of the Bura Project works for the irrigation of 7,000 hectares by the Tana River, about 400 km east of Nairobi. The project, started in April 1980, must be completed by the end of 1982. It is being carried out by HVA [expansion unknown] Kenya Ltd, a branch of HVA-Holland Agro-Industries BV [expansion unknown] of Amsterdam. This project, financed by the EDF [European Development Fund] and by the government of Kenya, to the tune of 190 million Kenyan shillings, will enable 5,000 farmers to settle and allow the production of great industrial crops on half of the irrigated area and fishponds on the rest of the area. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Oct 80 p 2430] 9465

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LIBERIA

BRIEFS

EEC RELATIONS BECOMING NORMALIZED—Mr Tipoteh, Liberian minister of planning and economic affairs, went to Brussels on 19 September 1980 for talks with high EEC officials. The freeze on community financial and technical cooperation reportedly was the main matter under discussion; the Liberian minister noted that his government had decided upon a certain normalization with respect to human rights. The African countries, very reserved about Liberia just a few weeks ago, reportedly began to soften their position so that Mr Tipoteh, for example, could participate in the recent ECOWAS meeting in Lome. Some Western countries are also moving toward normalization of relations with Liberia. Community officials noted these trends. They supposedly indicated that the draft program for Liberia will be revised shortly and that its implementation will be considered at a later date. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2482] 9479

STUDENTS IN USSR—The Liberian minister of education, Dr Henry Boima Fahnbulleh, announced on 16 September 1980 that 41 Liberian students had gone to the USSR since the 12 April 1980 coup d'etat, to pursue their higher studies. Dr Fahnbulleh pointed out that for 5 years Liberian students regularly went to the USSR, but last year, the 15 scholarships offered by the Soviet Union had not been used; the government of former President Tolbert had invoked "security reasons." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2482] 9479

IRREGULARITIES IN RICE SUPPLY—Little runs on rice, the Liberians' staple food, occur regularly when the distribution system breaks down, often causing some scuffles, according to observers. This phenomenon, which existed prior to the coup d'etat, shows how nervous the people are when faced with an apparent distribution problem rather than a real shortage. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2482] 9479

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NIGER

BRIEFS

WELL DIGGING PROGRAM--The Nigerien minister of hydrology, Dr Yahaya Tounara, recently visited the Say and Tera districts where 130 wells are being dug. In the Torodi district, 55 wells are planned and 49 have already been dug, while the Tera district will have 75 wells. The already-completed wells have an average depth of 50 meters and a yield of 2 to 3 cubic meters. These wells cost 350 million; 80 percent has been financed by the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation and 20 percent by the Aid and Cooperation Fund. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2480] 9479

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

FISHING WHARF IN DAKAR--The new fishing wharf in the west section of the autonomous port of Dakar was opened on 1 October 1980. This new wharf, 1,500 meters long, adds to 430 meters of old wharf, making nearly 2 km of wharf for fishing available. A total of 370 meters was dug at a depth of 10 meters, next to the interior access canal which was dredged to a depth of 11 meters. The work has created a 10.5 hectare jetty over the sea, equivalent to two-thirds the surface of nearby Goree Island. The wharves are equipped with the following harbor equipment: 52 water supply facilities and 29 gas-oil distributors. The electrical outlets for 220/380 volts can be used in case of a breakdown on the auxiliary cruiser or for repairs at sea. The boat lift is near the fishing wharf. The wharf also has telephone terminals for telephone communication between ships. Approximately, 6.6 hectares of jetty are usable on the pier; workshops, offices and a crushed ice plant could be set up there. A study will facilitate the integration of the new installations into the framework of the autonomous port of Dakar. The work has been going on for 36 months, since December 1977, and was completed 3 months early. The cost of this project is estimated at 5.5 billion CFA francs. It was financed by the World Bank, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, the Arab Bank for Development in Africa and the autonomous port of Dakar. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2476] 9479

AGRICULTURAL CAMPAIGN DEVELOPING NORMALLY--During the cabinet meeting on 15 September 1980, the Senegalese minister of rural development reported on three points: harvest progress, the food distribution situation in the pre-harvest period and implementation of measures to reorganize the countryside. According to the minister, the harvest was unfolding normally but no final conclusions could be drawn until the first half of October. On the subject of food supplies in the pre-harvest period, he told the council the dates the food would be delivered throughout the country. Finally, the minister indicated that all necessary measures to reorganize rural areas would be taken in time to provide a harmonious, effective beginning for all new structures. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2476] 9479

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TANZANIA

CHANGES IN RULES, PROCEDURES OF IMF REQUESTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Oct 80 p 2431

[Editorial: "Tanzania Wants a Modification of the World Bank Procedures" passages in slantlines published in italics]

[Text] According to an editorial written on 29 September in the government's daily paper the DAILY NEWS of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania asked the /World Bank/, whose annual session opened in Washington on 30 September, to change its rules and procedures in order to allow all countries to participate in its operation. The paper made clear that "it is true that the poor countries cannot manage without the easy short-term loans from the IMF," but it adds that it "is also true that the World Bank and the IMF need to try new ways, to change."

IMF Analysis

An area of agreement was finally found, and in the end the Fund approved the economic and financial measures recommended by Mr Nyerere's government. In a communique to the press, published by the IMF on this occasion, it gives, in effect, the following opinion about the Tanzanian economic situation.

Since 1974, Tanzania has been struggling with growing economic and financial problems. To a very great extent, these problems can be attributed to exogenic factors, such as the shortage of food caused by the drought, the fluctuation of the prices of exports, and the rise in price for imports, especially of oil and petroleum products. The disbanding of the East African Community in 1976 led to important economic upheavals, and recently the political changes in the region increased the constraints suffered by the economy, public finances, and the balance of payments. The problems were aggravated by the weak economy, for instance in its structure. If important progress was reported in food production, there followed a tendency towards lower production for the main harvests used for exports. Consequently, the position of the balance of payments was weakened, and a shortage of currency due to low exports led to a lower volume of imports, a substantial reduction in the use of industrial production capacity, and also led to the disrepair of infrastructure facilities. Growth in most of the economic sectors slowed down appreciably and the pressure of inflation grew. These were aggravated by an increase in the budgetary deficit, rapid increase of credit, and the weakening of certain semigovernmental enterprises.

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The objective of the present economic and financial program is to establish healthy foundations with a view towards a more balanced medium-term growth in domestic production, in particular by reversing the trend towards lower exports, alleviating the pressure on domestic prices, and reducing the deficit of payments while gradually liquidating back payments on imports that accumulated recently. To that end the program includes several measures aimed at improving the bases of productivity in the economy, and to keep demand within limits compatible with the financial resources of the country. To strengthen the economy, the main objective of the policy on production and investments is, from now on, to achieve a higher rate of production and to complete the investment projects that are productive, in particular those dealing with increased exports. Special attention is being paid to the development of agriculture, and further measures are being adopted to correct structural problems in transportation and certain other key sectors. Moreover, the government announced a rise in production costs for this and the next campaigns in order to encourage the farmers to increase production. It is also dealing with adjusting other prices so it can allocate resources more efficiently.

These measures concerning the offer are supplemented by a policy regulating demand and income so as to restore gradually a balance between domestic and foreign finances. Therefore, for the 1980-1981 fiscal year the government adopted a prudent attitude towards budgetary matters, marked by austerity in spending and the use of measures that would bring in added revenues. These measures aim at markedly reducing the total budget deficit, in absolute value as well as in the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product. Moreover, the government takes measures to improve the financial outcome of the semigovernmental sector, and for that it identifies and makes up for deficiencies in the financial structure, organization, and operation of the most important enterprises. In this context, the consumer prices for certain basic foodstuffs were recently raised. In matters of finance and credit, the objective of the governmental program for 1980-1981 is to support the effort for adjustment by reducing the rate of monetary expansion. Furthermore, it shows the willingness of the public authorities to keep a satisfactory structure for the foreign debt.

At present, the total amount Tanzania must repay the Fund for operations and previous transactions is 72.1 million SDR [Special Drawing Rights].

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

HUNGARIAN BUSES--Forty Hungarian Ikarus buses arrived in Dar es Salaam. They are large-capacity vehicles, costing a total of 27 million Tanzanian shillings, earmarked for the urban transport company Shirika La Usafiri Dar es Salaam (UDA) which brings the number of its Ikarus vehicles to 97 and that of its park buses to 202. The transport company plans to buy another 600 buses between 1980 and 1984. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Oct 80 p 2431] 9465

FOREIGN WHEAT--Tanzania will receive 16,335 tons of wheat by late October from the EEC, Canada, Spain and West Germany, announced the Tanzanian press agency SHIHATA on 4 October 1980. This gift will satisfy local demand for 2 months. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2495] 9479

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TOGO

BRIEFS

SAUDI-FINANCED PROJECTS--A Saudi-Development Fund delegation led by Mr Ali Jawhari stayed in Togo from 19 to 26 September to participate in the launching of some new projects financed by a Saudi loan signed between the two governments and to inquire into the progress of former projects. The latter include the following areas: the construction of two regional 40-bed hospitals each, one of which is in Pya and the other in Tchamba, the irrigation of the "Lions' Den," the construction of the Normal School for the Lama-Kara teachers, the installation of a language laboratory at the Benin University in Lome. The Saudi Fund has agreed to finance 45 percent of the construction of the dam which is to serve the Lions' Den; the regional hospitals will be financed up to 100 percent. As for the construction of the Normal School for the Lama-Kari teachers, it is to be jointly financed by the Saudi Fund and the World Bank. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2481] 8870

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